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Designing naval ship capabilities for shipbuilding is a challenging process 
requiring comprehensive technical and tactical studies. Technical studies involve 
ship design characteristics such as engineering, weapon, and support systems. 
Tactical studies include the anticipated area of operation, expected threat, the 
capabilities of the enemy, and potential missions to accomplish. Both studies are 
used in ship design to determine the ship’s required combat capabilities before 
finalizing the hull design. This research uses the agent-based modeling tool Map 
Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) to explore the best combat capabilities for 
a frigate in an anti-air warfare (AAW) environment. Regression and partition trees 
are used to analyze factors that influence the measures of the friendly frigate’s 
survivability and number of enemy casualties. This study also investigates the 
use of a prospective ship-based unmanned aerial vehicle in AAW operations. We 
find that the inclusion of a Point Defense Missile System with long and medium 
range surface-to-air missiles has the most positive effects on ship survivability. 
By contrast, we find the inclusion of a UAV in this mission has little effect. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 
A. OVERVIEW ..................................................................................... 1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................. 2 
C. SCOPE OF THE THESIS AND METHODOLOGY .......................... 2 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE ...................................................................... 4 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................. 5 
A. ANTI-AIR WARFARE ..................................................................... 5 
B. SHIP-BASED UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES ........................... 8 
C. AGENT-BASED SIMULATIONS..................................................... 9 
D. MAP AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA (MANA) .................. 10 
III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT ........................................................................ 15 
A. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION .......................................................... 15 
B. AGENT DESCRIPTIONS .............................................................. 16 
1. Friendly Assets ................................................................. 16 
2. Enemy Assets ................................................................... 19 
C. STOP CONDITIONS ..................................................................... 20 
D. SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ........................ 21 
1. Assumptions and Constraints ......................................... 21 
2. Limitations ......................................................................... 22 
E. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS ................................................ 22 
IV. MODEL EXPLORATION ......................................................................... 23 
A. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS ........................................................ 23 
B. DESIGN FACTORS ...................................................................... 24 
1. Controllable Factors ......................................................... 26 
2. Uncontrollable Factors ..................................................... 28 
C. DATA ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 28 
1. Analysis Tool .................................................................... 28 
2. Model Runs ....................................................................... 29 
3. Initial Analysis of the Data ............................................... 29 
4. Regression Analysis ........................................................ 31 
5. Classification and Regression Tree ................................ 42 
D. FACTOR SIGNIFICANCE ............................................................. 45 
1. Factor Significance in Frigate’s Survival Probability .... 45 
 viii 
2. Factor Significance in the Number of Enemy 
Casualties .......................................................................... 47 
V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 49 
A. SUMMARY .................................................................................... 49 
B. ANSWERING RESEARCH QUESTIONS ..................................... 49 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH ................................................................ 51 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 53 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. A Naval Ship in an AAW Environment.  Source: Oneindia 
News (2015). ................................................................................... 1 
Figure 2. USS Fort Worth (LCS-3) Launches First UAV. Source: 
America's Navy (2013). ................................................................... 3 
Figure 3. Anti-Air Warfare. Source: Defence News (n.d.). .............................. 5 
Figure 4. Exocet Finds Its Target During the Falklands War.  Source: 
Pagi (2016). ..................................................................................... 6 
Figure 5. Layered Air Defense. ....................................................................... 8 
Figure 6. Agent-Based Simulation of Foraging Sequence for Ants Using 
MASON Simulation Toolkit. Source: Luke, Cioffi-Revilla, 
Panait, Sullivan, & Balan (2016). ................................................... 10 
Figure 7. MANA Startup Screen. .................................................................. 11 
Figure 8. Squad Personalities Settings in MANA. ......................................... 12 
Figure 9. Weapon Settings in MANA. ........................................................... 13 
Figure 10. Screenshot of the Tactical Scenario. ............................................. 15 
Figure 11. Graphical Explanation of a Cookie-Cutter Sensor. ........................ 19 
Figure 12. Stop Conditions Menu in MANA. ................................................... 21 
Figure 13. Correlation Matrix of the Factors. .................................................. 23 
Figure 14. Scatterplot Matrix for the Factors................................................... 24 
Figure 15. Distribution for the Mean Frigate Survivability. .............................. 30 
Figure 16. Distribution for the Mean Enemy Casualties Showing a Bi-
modal Characteristic. ..................................................................... 30 
Figure 17. Distribution for the Mean Frigate Survivability (summarized 
data). ............................................................................................. 31 
Figure 18. Distribution for the Mean Enemy Casualties (Summarized 
Data). ............................................................................................. 32 
 x 
Figure 19. Effect Summary of the Factors for Main Effects Model. ................. 33 
Figure 20. Actual by Predicted Plot and the Summary of Fit for the Main 
Effects Model. ................................................................................ 34 
Figure 21. Expanded Estimates for the Main Effects Model. .......................... 34 
Figure 22. Prediction Expression of the Main Effects Model. ......................... 35 
Figure 23. Effect Summary of the Factors for the Second Order Model. ........ 36 
Figure 24. Actual by Predicted Plot and the Summary of Fit for the 
Second Order Model. .................................................................... 37 
Figure 25. Expanded Estimates for the Second Order Model. ....................... 38 
Figure 26. Effect Summary of the Factors for Main Effect Model. .................. 39 
Figure 27. Actual by Predicted Plot and the Summary of Fit for the Main 
Effects Model for Enemy Casualties. ............................................. 39 
Figure 28. Expanded Estimates for the Main Effects Model. .......................... 40 
Figure 29. Effect Summary of the Factors for Second Order Model. .............. 41 
Figure 30. Actual by Predicted Plot and the Summary of Fit for the 
Second Order Model. .................................................................... 42 
Figure 31. Candidate Split Points. .................................................................. 43 
Figure 32. Regression Tree for Frigate’s Survival Probability. ........................ 43 
Figure 33. Split History. .................................................................................. 44 
Figure 34. Contributions of the Factors. ......................................................... 45 
 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1. Characteristics of Sensors Onboard the Frigate. ........................... 16 
Table 2. Weapon Types and Specifications. ............................................... 17 
Table 3. Weapon Selection Options. ........................................................... 18 
Table 4. UAV Capabilities............................................................................ 19 
Table 5. Land-based ASMs Specifications. ................................................. 19 
Table 6. Enemy Aircrafts Specifications. ..................................................... 20 
Table 7. Enemy Air-to-Surface ASMs Specifications. .................................. 20 
Table 8. Design Factors. ............................................................................. 25 
Table 9. Possible Selection of SAMs ........................................................... 26 
Table 10. CIWS or PDMS Selection .............................................................. 27 
Table 11. Summary of the Factor Significance for a Frigate’s Survival 
Probability. ..................................................................................... 46 
Table 12. Summary of the Factor Significance for Number of Enemy 
Casualties. ..................................................................................... 47 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAW Anti-Air Warfare 
AICc Corrected Akaike Information Criterion 
ASM Anti-Ship Missile 
CIWS Close-in Weapon System 
DOE Design of Experiment 
EINSTein Enhanced ISAAC Neural Simulator Toolkit, where ISAAC is 
Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat. 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
LCS Littoral Combat Ship 
MANA  Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata  
MASON Multi-agent Simulator of Neighborhoods / Networks 
MOE Measure of Effectiveness 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NOLH Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
PDMS Point Defense Missile System 
Repast  Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit  
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile 
TERN Tactically Exploited Reconnaissance Node 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 














The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this 
research may not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort 
has been made within the time available to ensure that the programs are free of 
computational and logical errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any 









The combat capabilities of a future naval ship have to be considered 
thoroughly in the ship design process. These capabilities should be determined 
before the ship’s hull design is complete to make operational effectiveness 
independent from physical design considerations. The use of simulation with 
advanced experimental designs provides useful insights about the required 
combat systems in expected missions the ship must undertake. 
This thesis uses the Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) combat 
modeling tool to identify the best combination of weapons and radar 
characteristics onboard a frigate in an anti-air warfare (AAW) environment. The 
effectiveness of a prospective ship-based unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in an 
AAW operation is evaluated, as well. We develop an AAW scenario in MANA to 
investigate key weapons, sensor, and UAV effectiveness on ship survivability 
and enemy casualties. The MANA scenario representation appears in the 
following figure. It shows a lone AAW frigate threatened by missile-carrying 
aircraft and land launched anti-ship missiles from the shore. 
 
  
Figure1. Screenshot of the AAW Tactical Scenario Modeled in MANA 
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The frigate’s combat defense system is limited to four weapon systems 
due to space restrictions. A gun system is always preferred to be onboard due to 
its versatility in a variety of missions. The other three weapon systems consist of 
two types of surface-to-air missile systems (SAM) and either a Close-in Weapon 
System Gatling gun (CIWS) or a Point Defense Missile System (PDMS). These 
three weapon systems are changed in the experimental design to determine the 
best mix of weapon types for an AAW frigate in this tactical scenario. For the 
evaluation of the sensor capabilities we also vary the range of the radar from 
40,000 meters to 250,000 meters in the experimental design. The candidate 
weapons and their specifications are as shown in the following table. 
 
Table 1. Candidate Weapon Types and Specifications 
Weapon Minimum Range 
/ P (Hit) 
Maximum Range 
/ P (Hit) 
Target Type 
CIWS 1,000 m / 0.6 6,000 m / 0.4 Only missiles 
PDMS 1,000 m / 0.8 9,000 m / 0.6 Only missiles 
Gun 8,000 m / 0.3 14,000 m / 0.2 Both aircraft and 
missiles 




10,000 m / 0.8 70,000 m / 0.1 Both aircraft and 
missiles 
Long Range SAM 10,000 m / 0.8 200,000 m / 0.1 Both aircraft and 
missiles 
 
We use regression analysis and partition trees to analyze the results of 
25,700 simulated battles. The analysis shows that the most important design 
 xix 
factors for frigate AAW operations is the selection of CIWS or PDMS. 
Furthermore, it shows that the PDMS is superior to CIWS in enhancing ship 
survivability and inflicting enemy casualties. This study also demonstrates that 
longer range SAMs, the combination of the SAMs onboard, and longer radar 
range have significant impacts on the success of an AAW operation. In addition, 
this research provides evidence that the use of a medium range UAV in an AAW 
environment does not substantially contribute to mission success. Longer range 
UAVs with greater surveillance capabilities may have more effect, but they are 
not explored in this study. 
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Designing naval ship capabilities for shipbuilding is a challenging process 
requiring comprehensive technical and tactical studies. Technical studies involve 
ship design characteristics such as engineering, weapon, and support systems. 
Tactical studies include the anticipated area of operation, expected threat, the 
capabilities of the enemy, and potential missions to accomplish.  
Designing a naval ship is also a complicated process because it requires 
developing a system of systems (Mizine, Wintersteen, & Wynn, 2012). This 
article also states that since these systems interact and influence each other the 
developmental process is even more challenging. If we consider an entire fleet 
architecture rather than an individual ship design, this challenging work becomes 
further complicated. Moreover, a variety of expected threats need to be 
considered during the ship design process as well. For example, in an anti-air 
warfare (AAW) mission, weapons and radar systems influence each other and 
interact with the combat software system (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  A Naval Ship in an AAW Environment.  
Source: Oneindia News (2015). 
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Successfully defending naval ships from air threats depends mainly on 
force capabilities and the tactics of each opposing side. Considering the air 
defense capabilities of our forces against an enemy, an AAW frigate should be 
able to detect and eliminate enemy aircraft and guided missiles while deterring 
other threats, such as submarines, small craft, and other surface ships. To 
achieve this tactical objective, the ship’s weapon configuration should be 
determined as part of new ship construction design.  
There is limited space onboard a frigate; therefore, selecting the most 
effective combination of weapon systems to be included in the ship’s design is a 
matter of great importance. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research focuses on the following questions related to the 
improvement of the ship design process: 
 Among a set of air defense weapon systems alternatives, what is 
the most effective combination for a future AAW frigate design? 
 How effective are Point Defense Missile Systems (PDMS) 
compared to Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) with different 
weapon configurations? 
 Does employing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) onboard an 
AAW frigate have significant advantages in an AAW mission? 
 What is the probability of survivability against enemy air assets with 
different weapon combinations? 
 What are the strengths and drawbacks of utilizing Map Aware Non-
Uniform Automata (MANA) to construct realistic scenarios for 
evaluating AAW effectiveness of naval ships? 
C. SCOPE OF THE THESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis’ main focus is evaluating the effectiveness of different 
combinations of weapon types and radars onboard a frigate in a realistic AAW 
environment with the intent to inform Turkish AAW frigate design. This study also 
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explores how a UAV like the MQ-9 (Figure 2) can contribute to mission success 
by providing early warning to surface ships.  
 
Figure 2.  USS Fort Worth (LCS-3) Launches First UAV. 
Source: America's Navy (2013). 
We use an agent-based simulation modeling platform called MANA to 
model AAW scenarios, allowing us to assess the defensive capabilities of 
alternative combat system configurations on a future AAW frigate. “Agent-based 
simulations are models where multiple entities sense and stochastically respond 
to conditions in their local environments, mimicking complex large-scale system 
behavior” (Sanchez & Lucas, 2002). 
We create a base case tactical situation, threat, and combatant 
configuration in MANA for comparing alternatives. In the base case, a single 
AAW frigate is threatened by three enemy land-based anti-ship missiles (ASM) 
and two enemy aircraft each loaded with two ASMs. The AAW frigate has a 
medium-range air defense missile system (12 SAMs), short-range air defense 
missile system (16 SAMs), and CIWS.  
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In alternative scenarios the number of land-based ASMs and aircraft are 
varied. The weapon configuration and the radar range of the friendly frigate is 
also changed for each scenario. 
After creating the model in MANA, a Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
(NOLH) design is used to design a set of experiments by varying factors of threat 
and weapon capabilities. To analyze the output of the experiment, statistical 
summaries, multiple regression, partition trees, plots, and graphs are used. 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II is the literature review. It summarizes the basic concepts of the 
AAW mission and layered air defense systems, informs the reader about UAVs 
that can take off and land on small surface ships such as frigates or littoral 
combat ships (LCS), and discusses the agent-based simulation and modeling 
tool MANA.  
Chapter III contains the model development and descriptions of scenarios. 
Agent types with their specifications and the modeling assumptions are explained 
in this chapter as well. 
Chapter IV discusses the exploration of the model. It begins with an 
overview of the design of experiment used for the simulations; then, it explains 
controllable and uncontrollable factors. It continues with a detailed analysis of the 
model output using several data analysis techniques, such as least square 
regression and partition trees. It closes with a discussion of the significant factors 
discovered from the analysis.  
Chapter V concludes the thesis with a summary of the study, 
recommendations, and suggestions for further research.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The traditional approach in naval warship building is to design combat 
systems around the hull vessel platform. The platform, however, should be 
designed around the combat systems to build more effective warships. During 
the early conceptual design of a combat ship, computer simulation models, and 
experimental designs provide useful insights about the required weapon 
systems, radars and other combat systems (MacCalman, Beery, & Paulo, 2016). 
Therefore, operational effectiveness becomes independent of physical design 
considerations. In this study, our aim is to evaluate different operational 
characteristics of a frigate in an AAW environment to decide the best mix of 
weapons and sensors. In addition, we examine contributions of a prospective 
UAV in anti-air warfare. 
A. ANTI-AIR WARFARE 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) describes anti-air warfare 
as “measures taken to defend a maritime force against attacks by airborne 
weapons launched from aircraft, ships, submarines and land-based sites” (Anti-
air warfare, 2015) (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3.  Anti-Air Warfare. Source: Defence News (n.d.). 
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According to Defencyclopedia, today’s missiles are in common use among 
world navies due to their long ranges and accuracy (Defencyclopedia, 2014). The 
website further describes that most defense industry companies sell these deadly 
missiles at affordable prices to allow many countries to easily employ them 
onboard their warships. Missiles also offer massive destruction compared to 
large caliber guns (Figure 4).  
World navies prefer anti-ship missiles not only for their accuracy and long 
ranges, but also for their simplified launch procedures and maintenance 
simplicity. For ships operating near enemy ASM sites, there is a need for a 
defensive system that can counteract this powerful threat.  
 
Figure 4.  Exocet Finds Its Target During the Falklands War.  
Source: Pagi (2016). 
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Depending on the speed and flight paths of incoming missiles, defending 
ships have different time windows in which to acquire the incoming missile on 
their radar and engage it. For example, a missile which uses a sea skimming 
approach cannot be detected until it is 20–40 seconds from impact 
(Defencyclopedia, 2014). 
To defend itself from any incoming ASM, a warship is developed with 
multiple layers of air defenses (Figure-5). This allows engagement of an inbound 
threat by more than one weapon system. Layered air defense usually consists of 
a combination of: 
 Long range surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
 Medium range SAM 
 Short range SAM 
 Medium caliber gun 
 Point Defense Missile System (PDMS) 
 Small caliber gun with a high rate of fire (Close-in Weapon System 
- CIWS) 
 Electronic jamming and countermeasures 




Layered Air Defense allows engagement of enemy threats at multiple ranges and 
by more than one defensive system. 
Figure 5.  Layered Air Defense. 
B. SHIP-BASED UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 
In this decade unmanned systems are very common in almost every 
environment. They provide new and enhanced capabilities to the warfighter (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2013).  
Modern navies need to conduct airborne intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) anywhere and anytime (Patt, n.d.). The report also 
describes that current technologies have their limitations. For example, 
helicopters have limited range and flight time. Fixed-wing manned and 
unmanned aircraft have longer range but require longer runways, such as those 
on aircraft carriers or at land bases. 
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To help overcome these challenges world navies try to develop unmanned 
aerial vehicles that can be stationed onboard warships, such as littoral combat 
ships, frigates, and destroyers. As an example, the U.S. Department of Defense 
recently launched the Tactically Exploited Reconnaissance Node (TERN) 
program in 2014 to fill this need (Patt, n.d.). This aerial system will be capable of 
conducting UAV operations from most ship types and in rough sea conditions 
without extensive ship modifications. 
C. AGENT-BASED SIMULATIONS 
“Agent-based simulations are models where agents, objects, or entities 
sense and stochastically respond autonomously to conditions in their local 
environments” (Sanchez & Lucas, 2002). We use agent-based models to assess 
the effects of these individual agents’ actions and interactions on the system. In 
agent-based models agents behave autonomously according to predefined rules. 
Agent-based models have various areas of application, including military 
applications. Decision-making processes and training plans can be improved by 
using agent-based models. Furthermore, we can test tactics and war principles to 
determine better force structures, decide the best mix of weapons, or improve the 
procurement process (Cioppa, 2003). 
There are many agent-based modeling tools for military applications. 
Several of these toolkits are BactoWars, EINSTein, MASON, NetLogo, Repast, 
Swarm, WISDOM, and MANA (Figure 6). MANA is selected for this research 





Figure 6.  Agent-Based Simulation of Foraging Sequence for Ants Using 
MASON Simulation Toolkit. Source: Luke, Cioffi-Revilla, Panait, 
Sullivan, & Balan (2016). 
D. MAP AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA (MANA) 
Developed by the Defence Technology Agency in New Zealand, MANA 
Version V is used in this thesis as a simulation platform. MANA is a time-
stepped, stochastic, agent-based simulation tool designed for simulating real life 
military scenarios (G. McIntosh, 2009). (See Figure 7). 
MANA is easy to use and offers a straightforward interface for setting 
battle parameters (Berryman, 2008). MANA tries to capture the essence of the 
physical and behavioral aspects of the scenario, but it avoids unnecessary 
details (e.g., detailed flight paths of missiles). In MANA, a basic military scenario 
can be built quickly. After creating a basic model one can change the agent’s 
parameters and characteristics to make the scenario more accurate and realistic. 
 11 
 
Figure 7.  MANA Startup Screen. 
The primary element of MANA models is the squad. A squad can consist 
of one or more homogeneous agents. Agents in MANA are map-aware, which 
means they can sense the characteristics of the environment through organic 
sensors or inorganic sensors (e.g., communication with other agents). Each 
agent has different properties. Each agent behaves independently according to 
the environment and the user defined rules. 
Each agent in MANA has behavioral characteristics that determine its 
propensity to move toward or away from particular objects or agents, such as 
enemy aircraft in AAW missions or a high value unit in military convoy 
operations. Users can change these settings in the squad properties window (G. 
McIntosh, 2007) (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8.  Squad Personalities Settings in MANA. 
MANA also offers predefined states, as shown on the right side of the 
screenshot in Figure 8 (e.g., enemy contact, injured, or out of fuel) and a user 
can define different personality settings for each state.  
Besides behavioral characteristics, each agent has physical 
characteristics. For instance, each agent has sensors, weapons, communication 
links between each other, speed, personal concealment, etc. An agent can 
detect and classify other agents within range of its sensors and can shoot 
classified enemy agents using its weapons (Figure 9). The personal concealment 
factor of an agent is used to simulate the stealth capability of an agent. 
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Figure 9.  Weapon Settings in MANA. 
Another powerful aspect of MANA is that agents can share situational 
awareness through communication links. Users can determine the characteristics 
of these communication links, such as range, reliability, delivery method 
(guaranteed delivery or fire and forget), and communication link latency (G. 
McIntosh, 2007). 
MANA is a commonly used simulation tool at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS), and it has been widely used for both military and academic 
studies by NPS faculty and students. Past studies similar to our approach include 
UAV contributions to expeditionary operations (Raffetto, 2004), counter-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden (Tsilis, 2011), operational effectiveness of a small 
surface combat ship in an anti-surface warfare environment (Kaymal, 2013), and 
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effectiveness of unmanned surface vehicles in anti-submarine warfare (Unlu, 
2015). In this study MANA is used in a similar manner for simulating tactical 
situations, but unlike the studies mentioned previously, the focus is an AAW 
environment. In addition, the purpose of this study is to inform ship design, not 




III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
In this thesis the agent-based combat modeling tool MANA is used to 
simulate a single frigate in an anti-air warfare environment.  
In the scenario there is one friendly AAW frigate, and it has one UAV 
onboard. The frigate is attacked by both land based anti-ship cruise missiles 
(ASMs) and air-to-surface ASMs launched by enemy aircraft. The frigate uses its 
layered air defense system to protect against these enemy assets. A screenshot 
of the scenario from MANA appears in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  Screenshot of the Tactical Scenario. 
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The battlefield is 150 × 100 nautical miles (nm). In the MANA scenario 
(Figure 10), the blue colored area represents the sea and the yellow colored area 
is land. 
B. AGENT DESCRIPTIONS 
There are five different types of agents in the scenario. A frigate and a 
UAV onboard the frigate are friendly assets. Enemy assets are land-based 
ASMs, aircraft, and air-to-surface ASMs launched by the aircraft. 
1. Friendly Assets 
Friendly assets are trying to defend themselves while conducting an ISR 
mission in the area of interest. The UAV shares its situational awareness with the 
frigate through a directed data link. 
a. Frigate 
In this scenario the AAW frigate moves in a predetermined course with a 
speed of 25 knots (kts). The frigate has sensors and weapons to detect and 
neutralize enemy assets. If the frigate detects any enemy agent, it changes 
course to close with them.  
There are two types of sensors onboard the frigate. One of them is a 
general purpose air-search radar, which is used to detect aircraft. The other is a 
missile-search radar, which is good at detecting relatively small targets but has 
shorter range. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of these radars. 
Table 1.   Characteristics of Sensors Onboard the Frigate. 
Radar Range Target Type 
Air search radar 53,000* m Aircraft 
Missile search radar 25,000 m Missiles 
*Air search radar range is changed in the design to find the best design range. 
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The frigate’s layered defense is limited to four weapon systems due to 
space restriction. A gun system is always preferred to be onboard. The other 
three weapon systems consist of two surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) and 
either a Close-in Weapon System Gatling gun (CIWS) or a Point Defense Missile 
System (PDMS). These three weapon systems are changed in the experimental 
design to determine the best mix of weapon types for an AAW frigate in this 
tactical scenario. Table 2 summarizes the weapon types and their specifications. 
P(Hit) represents the probability of hit and MANA interpolates this value for any 
distance between the maximum and minimum range. 
Table 2.   Weapon Types and Specifications. 
Weapon Minimum Range 
/ P (Hit) 
Maximum Range 
/ P (Hit) 
Target Type 
CIWS 1,000 m / 0.6 6,000 m / 0.4 Only missiles 
PDMS 1,000 m / 0.8 9,000 m / 0.6 Only missiles 
Gun 8,000 m / 0.3 14,000 m / 0.2 Both aircraft and 
missiles 




10,000 m / 0.8 70,000 m / 0.1 Both aircraft and 
missiles 





For simulation and experimental design purposes, we categorize SAM and 
CIWS/PDMS alternatives into options. Table 3 depicts the mapping between the 
option number and the actual weapon names in that option. Again, a main gun 
system is present for every option. 
Table 3.   Weapon Selection Options. 
SAM Options Active SAM Names 
1 Medium Range SAM & Short Range SAM 
2 Long Range SAM & Short Range SAM 
3 Long Range SAM & Medium Range SAM 




b. Ship-based UAV 
The ship-based UAV’s aim is to provide early warning for the frigate via a 
data link. The UAV flies in a predetermined course and tries to detect enemy 
assets with its cookie-cutter sensor, which has range of 60,000 meters. A cookie-
cutter sensor means that it detects any target within its range with certainty 
(Figure 11). The UAV does not have any weapon. For each tactical situation 
simulated with a UAV, the aircraft is assumed airborne at the time of the attack. 
We did not assign an on station time for the UAV because each attack takes at 
most 30 minutes. Table 4 summarizes the capabilities of the UAV. 
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Table 4.   UAV Capabilities. 
Sensor Weapon  Speed Data Link 
Cookie cutter 60,000 m Not Applicable 150 kts Yes. 360,000 m 
 
Figure 11.  Graphical Explanation of a Cookie-Cutter Sensor. 
2. Enemy Assets 
Enemy assets consist of land-based ASMs, aircraft, and air-to-surface 
ASMs launched by aircraft. 
a. Land-based ASMs 
Land-based ASMs proceed directly to the target frigate using their inertial 
navigation system and active radar. They explode within 100 meters of the 
target. The specifications of the ASMs are as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Land-based ASMs Specifications. 
Enemy Name Range Speed Guidance System 
Land-based ASM 180 nm 1,800 kts  Active Radar Homing 
 
b. Aircraft 
Aircraft are each equipped with two air-to-surface ASMs. They launch both 
missiles when the friendly AAW frigate is in range of their weapon. After firing 
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their missiles, they fly back to their base to avoid any possible enemy fire. We do 
not determine flight time limits for the aircraft because the tactical simulation 
takes only 30 minutes and is close to shore, well within the range of most tactical 
aircraft. Specifications of the enemy aircraft are as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6.   Enemy Aircrafts Specifications. 








c. Air-to-Surface ASMs 
ASM missiles are launched from enemy aircraft and have an active radar 
guidance system. They fly directly to the target with a speed of 1,800 knots. They 
explode when they reach 500 meters of the target. Specifications of the air-to-
surface missiles appear in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Enemy Air-to-Surface ASMs Specifications. 
Enemy Name Range Speed Guidance System 
Air-to-Surface ASMs 50,000 m 1,800 kts.  Active Radar Homing 
 
C. STOP CONDITIONS 
In MANA, stop conditions cause the simulation to terminate in order to 
reduce run time and save overall experiment time (Figure 12). The tactical 
simulation for our model will stop when either or both of the following conditions 
occur: 
 The friendly frigate is killed. 





Figure 12.  Stop Conditions Menu in MANA. 
D. SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Any simulation includes assumptions and limitations because it is 
impossible to imitate exact real-world events. These assumptions and limitations, 
however, need to be plausible to provide useful insights about the real world. 
1. Assumptions and Constraints 
The key assumptions and constraints for this analysis are: 
 Only air threats are taken into account.  
 Aircraft fly back to their base as soon as they launch missiles. 
 Logistics are not considered (no reload of weapons for each side). 
 Two missiles are loaded on each enemy aircraft. 
 Space in the frigate design limits the number of AAW defense 
systems to three (besides medium caliber gun). Soft kill methods 
are neglected (electronic jamming, chaff, and flares). 
 UAV shares its situational awareness with the frigate. 
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2. Limitations 
Limitations are related to the modeling platform, MANA, and the 
unclassified information sources. 
 Performance characteristics of radars and weapons are derived 
from open internet sources. Therefore, they are not exact.  
 Many features of aerial platforms and weapons are not included in 
MANA. For example: 
1. An actual weaving flight path of a misslie cannot be 
simulated.  
2. Probability of detection does not differ according to the 
aircraft or missile’s altitude.  
E. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Survivability of friendly frigate and the number of red casualties are the 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) in this study. In this analysis, the frigate 
survives if it is hit two or fewer times. If the frigate survives after all enemy 
attacks, it is a success. If the frigate is shot three or more times and killed, it is a 
failure.  
For the second MOE we focus on the number of enemy casualties, either 
aircraft or missile. 
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IV. MODEL EXPLORATION 
A. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
The design of experiment (DOE) is a technique to examine the 
relationships between design factors and outcomes. Design factors are the 
inputs to the simulation, and the outcomes are the two MOEs. 
To create a simulation of military operations, the designer must consider 
many factors that affect the outcome. These factors can be controllable or 
uncontrollable. For example, weapon selection onboard a frigate is a controllable 
factor, but the number of enemy aircraft is an uncontrollable factor.  
In this thesis’ experimental design, there are seven controllable and two 
uncontrollable factors. These factors are discussed in the subsequent section. 
The nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) spreadsheet is used to generate 
design points in this analysis (Sanchez, 2011). NOLH designs have good space-
filling properties, and they are almost orthogonal (Cioppa & Lucas, 2007). For 
example, the maximum correlation between the columns in our design matrix 
used in this thesis is 0.0659 (Figure 13). The scatterplot matrix of the NOLH 
design we used appears in Figure 14. For greater flexibility in generating NOLHs, 
see Hernandez et al. 2012. 
 
Figure 13.  Correlation Matrix of the Factors. 
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The space filling property of the NOLH design can be easily seen in the above 
plot. 
Figure 14.  Scatterplot Matrix for the Factors. 
B. DESIGN FACTORS 
Many factors can affect an AAW operation. In the simulation, a total of 
nine factors were varied to determine the best combination of weapons. A list of 
factors and their explanation is shown in Table 8. These factors are explained in 
the subsequent sections as well. 
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Table 8.   Design Factors. 
Factor Name Explanation Min  Max  Unit 
Controllable Factors 
SAM Option 
Selection of surface to 
air missiles onboard 
Refer to Table 3 
CIWS/PDMS 
Selection of either 
CIWS or PDMS 
Refer to Table 3 
UAV Presence of UAV 0 1 - 
BlueShipRadar 
Range of the frigate’s 
air search radar 
40,000 250,000 meter 
BlueShipShortSAMRng 
Range of the frigate’s 
Short range SAM 
5,000 35,000 meter 
BlueShipMedSAMRng 
Range of the frigate’s 
Short range SAM 
10,000 85,000 meter 
BlueShipLongSAMRng 
Range of the frigate’s 
Short range SAM 
10,000 200,000 meter 
Uncontrollable Factors 
LandBasedASMs 
Number of enemy 
land based anti-ship 
missiles 
2 6 - 
RedAircraft 
Number of enemy 
aircraft (each carrying 
two ASMs) 




1. Controllable Factors 
Controllable factors can be determined during the ship design process of 
the frigate. In this thesis, selection of the SAM types onboard, CIWS or PDMS 
selection, presence of UAV and range of the sensors and the SAMs are 
controllable factors.  
a. Surface-to-Air Missile Options 
As mentioned earlier, we divided SAMs into three groups: short range 
SAM, medium range SAM, and long range SAM. Due to the space restriction in 
the frigate, we employ two SAM types at a time. The possible selections of these 
two missile types and number of available missiles onbaord are as shown in 
Table 9. 
Table 9.   Possible Selection of SAMs 
SAM Options Active SAM Names 
1 
Medium Range SAM (12 missiles) & Short 
Range SAM (16 missiles) 
2 
Long Range SAM (12 missiles) & Short 
Range SAM (16 missiles) 
3 
Long Range SAM (12 missiles) & Medium 
Range SAM (16 missiles) 
 
b. CIWS versus PDMS Selection 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the CIWS and PDMS in an AAW mission, 
we introduce a factor which activates and deactivates either CIWS or PDMS 
onboard the frigate. In doing so, we intend to find which weapon type is superior 
to the other. Table 10 explains the mapping between selection number and the 
active weapon system. 
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Table 10.   CIWS or PDMS Selection 
CIWS/PDMS Options Active Weapon (CIWS or PDMS) 
1 CIWS (12 burst) 
2 PDMS (21 missiles) 
 
It is very easy to simulate most weapons in MANA due to its user friendly 
interface. Simulating rapid firing guns like CIWS, however, is not straightforward.  
In MANA the weapon properties menu is designed for missiles, because it 
asks for a set of values for a single shot rather than a burst of fire. For example, 
MANA uses a number of shots per second and calculates the remaining 
ammunition according to this ratio. To overcome this issue we input the values of 
the CIWS burst capacity rather than an individual round. 
c. Presence of UAV 
Whether a UAV is present in the AAW scenario is a controllable factor in 
the experimental design. This factor can represent the capability of the frigate 
and it may be related to the tactics as well. Even if the frigate is capable of 
carrying a UAV, the commanding officer may choose not to conduct UAV 
operations due to the tactical situation. 
d. Sensor Range 
In AAW operations, the frigate has to detect and classify the enemy assets 
as soon as possible to defend effectively. Classification of the enemy assets is 
crucial in defense and depends on design characteristics of the ship’s radar and 
time to classify once a target is detected. Therefore, the radar’s range is 
designed to be a controllable factor in the study. It varies from 40,000 meters to 
250,000 meters. 
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e. Surface-to-Air Missile Ranges 
There are different types of SAMs in the defense industry and they differ 
from each other in their capabilities and costs. To see the effect of different 
SAMs’ ranges in an AAW engagement, this is introduced in the experiment as a 
controllable factor. 
2. Uncontrollable Factors 
Uncontrollable factors, also known as noise factors, are related to enemy 
capabilities or characteristics of the operational environment. In this thesis, there 
are two uncontrollable factors: number of enemy aircraft (loaded with two ASMs) 
and number of enemy land-based ASMs. 
a. Enemy Aircraft 
The number of enemy aircraft is a factor in the experimental design. It 
ranges from two to five aircraft. Each aircraft launches its ASMs individually as 
soon as the frigate is in range of their weapon, and each aircraft flies back to its 
base. 
b. Enemy Land-based ASMs 
The number of enemy land-based ASMs is another factor that ranges from 
two to six missiles.  
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
In this section we explain the analysis tool used, model runs, and initial 
analysis of the data, and then we discuss regression analysis and partition tree 
analysis. 
1. Analysis Tool 
JMP statistical discovery software offers both powerful statistics and 
dynamic graphics capabilities to its users. In the thesis, JMP statistical discovery 
software version 12.0.1 is used to analyze the data. 
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2. Model Runs 
As previously indicated, nine factors are included in the model. Two 
hundred fifty-seven design points were generated using the NOLH design and 
100 replications for each of these design points were simulated. As a result 
25,700 AAW scenarios are simulated. 
In this model, one second is one simulated time step. As Buss and Al 
Rowaei state, the time step selection has an important impact on the outcome of 
the model (Buss & Al Rowaei, 2010). They also explain that models with larger 
time steps take less time but may yield erroneous results. Therefore, time step 
selection should be considered thoroughly to get correct results in a reasonable 
time period. Because of the high speed of ASMs, a one-second time step is 
selected to capture the rapid nature of AAW tactics. 
3. Initial Analysis of the Data 
A total of 25,700 rows of raw data from the simulation experiments are 
imported into JMP for analysis. To explore the survivability of the frigate, we 
created a new column by subtracting the frigate casualty percent column from 
one. Figure 15 displays the distribution of the frigate’s probability of survival in 
the overall replications. Average survivability is around 0.551, with a standard 
deviation of 0.497. The upper and lower 95 percent confidence interval is as 
shown in Figure 15.  
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The right bar in the figure corresponds to the proportion of the runs in which the 
frigate survives (55% of the time) and the left bar the proportion in which it does 
not (45% of the time). 
Figure 15.  Distribution for the Mean Frigate Survivability. 
For the exploration of the second MOE, we created a distribution plot of 
the mean number of enemy casualties (Figure 16). As it appears in Figure 16, 
the mean enemy casualties has a bimodal distribution with a mean of 8.748 
casualties and a standard deviation of 4.745. The distribution has two distinct 
peak points, in other words, two modes. 
 
Figure 16.  Distribution for the Mean Enemy Casualties Showing a Bi-
modal Characteristic. 
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4. Regression Analysis 
In our raw data there are 100 replications for each of the 257 design 
points. Although the input parameters stay the same across 100 replications, the 
outcome will vary due to stochasticity originating from the MANA modeling 
platform. This randomness causes difficulty in fitting the regression model. To 
overcome this difficulty, we summarize the data by taking the means of the 
factors and the response for each design point. Therefore, the survivability 
response becomes the probability of survivability ranging from zero to one, and 
the number of enemy casualties becomes the mean number of enemy casualties 
ranging from zero to 19. They are now both continuous variables.  
Distributions of the frigate’s survivability and the enemy casualties for the 
summarized data are as shown on Figure 17 and Figure 18. We should note that 
the summary statistics are the same as the previous distributions.  
 




Figure 18.  Distribution for the Mean Enemy Casualties (Summarized 
Data). 
We use regression analysis to investigate the relationships between the 
design factors and our MOEs. There are many techniques for regression 
analysis; the corrected Akeike Information Criterion (AICc) stepwise technique is 
used in this study.  
We first fit the model with only main effect terms, then we add a second 
order polynomial and two-way interaction terms into the model to investigate their 
value as predictors. 
We need to note that, due to the binary responses, the basic assumptions 
for linear regression are not met. Specifically, the errors will not be normally 
distributed with a constant variance. In addition, the regression equation may 
make predictions less than zero or more than one at the extremes, while the 
response must be restricted to between zero and one.  
However, the purpose of our analysis is to identify and quantify the 
relationship between the input variables and the response rather than predicting 
the response (Kleijnen et al. 2005). As noted by Hellevik (2009), “the intuitively 
meaningful interpretation of linear regression makes it easier to communicate 
research results than logistic regression.” The p-values cannot be reliably used 
because the error terms are not normally distributed. The coefficient estimates 
are not optimal in terms of power, but they are unbiased. Moreover, optimal 
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power is not a critical issue given our large sample and high R-square value. For 
more discussion on this, see Hellevik (2009). 
a. Main Effects Model for the Frigate Survivability 
Using the stepwise method with only main effect terms we defined the 
best predictors as shown in Figure 19. The factors are listed in order according to 
their effects on the response. For example, the effect of the CIWS/PDMS 
selection on survivability is greater than the range of the radars. We should also 
note the two uncontrollable factors of number of red aircraft and land launched 
ASCMs are in the model. The UAV factor, though, is not included in the model as 
a significant predictor of survivability.  
  
Uncontrollable factors 
Figure 19.  Effect Summary of the Factors for Main Effects Model. 
Figure 20 displays the actual values by predicted values and summary of 
the fitted model. As mentioned earlier, the UAV factor is excluded from the 
model, because it is not significant enough to enter the model. The R-Square 
value of the model is 0.857, which means our model can explain 85.7 percent of 
the variability of the response. 
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Figure 20.  Actual by Predicted Plot and the Summary of Fit for the Main 
Effects Model. 
Figure 21 displays the expanded parameter estimates for the main effects 
model. The t ratio values represent the significance of the factors’ effect on 
survivability. Factors indicated with red dashed boxes have more significant 
effect on survivability as compared to other factors. 
 
Figure 21.  Expanded Estimates for the Main Effects Model. 
 35 
As shown in the prediction expression (Figure 20), an increase in the 
uncontrollable factors decreases the probability of survivability. Conversely, an 
increase in controllable factors increases the survivability rate. Interestingly, the 
selection of the CIWS (CIWS/PDMS=1) and SAM Option 1 (Medium and short 
range SAM) decreases the probability of survival.  
 
Figure 22.  Prediction Expression of the Main Effects Model. 
As a result of this analysis, we conclude that selection of PDMS 
(CIWS/PDMS=2), a mix of medium and long range SAM (SAM Option=3), and 




b. Second Order Model for Frigate Survivability 
After exploring the main effects model, we fit the model with main effects, 
second order polynomial, and two-way interaction terms as predictors, to find 
their impact on the frigate’s survival probability. The terms that are significant 
enough to enter the model appear in Figure 23. The first five significant factors 
are still main effects, although we added polynomials and the two-way 
interactions to the model. 
 
Figure 23.  Effect Summary of the Factors for the Second Order Model. 
The actual by predicted plot and the summary of fit for the second order 
model is as shown in Figure 24. The R-squared value of this model is .90, which 
means that 90 percent of the variability in the simulation can be explained using 
this regression model. 
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Figure 24.  Actual by Predicted Plot and the Summary of Fit for the 
Second Order Model. 
Expanded parameter estimates for the main effects model are shown in 
Figure 25. According to the t ratio values, the same main effect terms as in the 
previous model are more significant in regard to survivability as compared to the 
others. The two-way interactions—CIWS/PDMS × Land-based ASM and 
CIWS/PDMS × range of the long range SAM—are relatively significant factors 
compared to other two-way interactions. Interestingly, the quadratic term of the 
radar range has a greater effect than the main effect of the radar range. 




Figure 25.  Expanded Estimates for the Second Order Model. 
c. Main Effects Model for the Number of Enemy Casualties 
Using the stepwise regression technique with AICc criterion, the factors 
shown in Figure 26 are significant enough to be a predictor of the number of 
enemy causalities. Differing from the main effects model for frigate survivability, 
the range of the short range SAM and number of land attack missiles are not 
significant predictors in this model.  
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Figure 26.  Effect Summary of the Factors for Main Effect Model. 
The actual by predicted plot and the summary of fit of the main effects 
model is as shown in Figure 27. The R squared value is around 0.787 for this 
model. 
  
Figure 27.  Actual by Predicted Plot and the Summary of Fit for the Main 
Effects Model for Enemy Casualties. 
Expanded parameter estimates appear in Figure 28. According to t ratio 
values, CIWS/PDMS selection, range of long range SAM, SAM option ,and 
number of aircraft have more significant effects as compared to radar range and 
medium range SAM’s range.  
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Figure 28.  Expanded Estimates for the Main Effects Model. 
d. Second Order Model for the Number of Enemy Casualties 
To evaluate the effects of two-way interactions and polynomial terms, we 
build the second order regression model for the number of enemy casualties 
using the same regression technique and AICc criterion. Predictors used in this 
model appear in Figure 29.  
 41 
 
Figure 29.  Effect Summary of the Factors for Second Order Model. 
The R squared value is around 0.88 for the second order model. Figure 30 
displays the summary of fit and actual by predict plot. As shown, CIWS/PDMS 
selection, range of long range SAM, number of enemy aircraft, SAM option and 
CIWS/PDMS × number of enemy aircraft are the five most significant factors in 




Figure 30.  Actual by Predicted Plot and the Summary of Fit for the 
Second Order Model. 
5.  Classification and Regression Tree 
Classification and regression trees offer an easy way to examine the 
contribution of the factors to the outcome. Classification trees are used when the 
response or outcome is discrete or categorical. If the response is a continuous 
variable, regression trees are used. We use regression trees for analysis of the 
factors that affect the frigate’s survival probability using the summarized data.  
After building our regression tree model, we examine the candidate split 
point reports generated by JMP (Figure 31), which shows the LogWorth value of 
the factors. The split occurs according to the LogWorth statistic. For example, the 
CIWS/PDMS factor is the first optimal split point in the model.  
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Figure 31.  Candidate Split Points. 
The regression tree appears in Figure 32. As stated earlier, the first split 
occurs with the CIWS/PDMS selection factor. If CIWS is selected in the design 
the survival probability becomes 0.25; however, it increases up to 0.85 if PDMS 
is employed.  
 
Figure 32.  Regression Tree for Frigate’s Survival Probability. 
The second partition occurs under selection of CIWS (CIWS/PDMS=1) 
with the range of long range SAM. This means that if CIWS is employed and the 
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range of the long range SAM is less than 153,984 meters, the probability of 
survival becomes 0.18. If the range is above 153,984, the survival probability is 
0.46. It is also shown on the right leaf of the tree that if PDMS is employed and 
the number of aircraft is less than or equal to four, the frigate’s survival rate 
becomes 0.90.  
After seven splits we reach an R square value of 0.842. An increase in the 
number of splits always yields an increase in the R squared value. Furthermore, 
more splits cause additional complexity in the tree, and it does not contribute to 
the model significantly. Figure 33 displays the split history (number of splits vs. R 
squared value). After the seventh split, more splitting does not contribute to our 
model in terms of R squared value. 
 
 
Figure 33.  Split History. 
To evaluate the contributions of the factors, we need to examine the 
column contributions report created by JMP (Figure 34). As it is easily seen in 
this report, the most significant five factors are the same as the previous ones.  
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Figure 34.   Contributions of the Factors. 
D. FACTOR SIGNIFICANCE 
The significance of specific design factors in regard to a frigate’s 
survivability and the number of enemy casualties is summarized in the following 
subsections. 
1. Factor Significance in Frigate’s Survival Probability 
For the particular AAW scenario in this thesis, factors that are determined 




Table 11.   Summary of the Factor Significance for a Frigate’s Survival 
Probability. 






CIWS/PDMS Selection 1 1 1 
Range of Long Range SAM 2 2 2 
Number of Enemy Aircraft 3 3 4 
Number of Land Based ASMs 4 4 3 
SAM Option 5 5 5 
Range of Medium Range SAM 6 10 - 
Radar Range 7 8 - 
UAV - 18 - 
 
The selection of the CIWS/PDMS is the most significant design factor. 
Employment of the PDMS is superior to CIWS in terms of a frigate’s survivability. 
This makes sense as PDMS has higher probability of hit compared to CIWS. 
The range of the long range SAM is the second most significant design 
factor that affects the frigate’s survivability. An increase in the range, increases 
survivability.  
The third and fourth most important factors are the number of enemy 
aircraft and land-based ASMs. It is obvious that if the number of enemy assets 
increases, the survival probability of the friendly frigate decreases. These are 
uncontrollable factors, but they can be estimated according to the planned 
operational employment of the prospective frigates. 
SAM option is the other factor that has a significant effect on the friendly 
frigate’s survivability. Although SAM option 1 decreases the survivability, 
selection of SAM option 2 or SAM option 3 increases the survival probability. 
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Among all SAM options, the selection of long range and medium range SAM 
(option 3) has the most positive effect on survivability of the frigate. This makes 
sense, as it is better to counter threats at longer ranges. Range of the radar and 
the medium range SAM are additional significant factors. 
Use of the UAV in AAW operation does not have a significant effect on the 
frigate’s survivability. Our purpose of including a UAV in the scenario is to 
explore whether a UAV provides early warning for the frigate to counteract an 
enemy threat. As a result of the analysis, the presence of the UAV does not 
appear to be a significant factor in AAW mission in terms of frigate’s survivability. 
Longer range UAVs with greater surveillance capabilities may have more effect, 
but they are not explored in this study. 
2. Factor Significance in the Number of Enemy Casualties 
Table 12 displays the significant factors in the number of enemy casualties 
and their rankings. The results are almost the same as the previous ones. 
Table 12.   Summary of the Factor Significance for Number of Enemy 
Casualties. 
Factor Name Main Effects Model Second Order Model 
CIWS/PDMS Selection 1 1 
Range of Long Range SAM 2 2 
Number of Enemy Aircraft 3 3 
Number of Land Based ASMs 4 - 
SAM Option 5 4 
Range of Medium Range SAM 6 7 
Radar Range 7 8 








This research investigates the effectiveness of combinations of weapons 
and sensors onboard a frigate in an AAW environment. It also evaluates the 
effectiveness of an unmanned aerial vehicle for an AAW mission. By doing so 
our aim is to determine the needed weapon and sensor capabilities before ship 
hull design is complete to make operational effectiveness independent from 
physical design considerations. 
An AAW scenario was built to evaluate the candidate weapons, sensor 
capabilities, and use of a prospective UAV in an AAW operation. We ran 25,700 
simulated AAW battles in MANA, and the resulting data were imported to the 
JMP statistical discovery program for analysis purposes. Due to limitations of 
MANA, a few characteristics of the AAW environment, such as the flight pattern 
of the missiles and the altitude of the aircraft, could not be represented. We also 
made assumptions related to enemy tactics and the operational environment. 
Therefore, this study could not answer all questions related to the capabilities 
needed for AAW operations. It does, however, provide useful insights about 
weapon and sensor employment onboard an AAW frigate. 
The result of this analysis shows that the most important design factor for 
frigate AAW operations is the selection of CIWS or PDMS. Moreover, it shows 
that PDMS is superior to CIWS. This study also posits that the range of the 
SAMs, the combination of the SAMs onboard, and radar range have significant 
impacts on the success of an AAW operation. In addition, this research provides 
evidence that the use of a medium range UAV in an AAW environment does not 
significantly contribute to mission success. 
B. ANSWERING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions introduced in the beginning of the thesis are as 
follows: 
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1. Among a set of air defense weapon systems alternatives, 
what is the most effective combination for a future AAW 
frigate design? 
2. How effective are Point Defense Missile Systems (PDMS) 
compared to Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) with 
different weapon configurations? 
3. Does employing a prospective unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) onboard AAW frigates have significant advantages in 
an AAW mission? 
4. What is the probability of survivability against enemy air 
assets with different weapon combinations? 
5. What are the strengths and drawbacks of utilizing Map 
Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) to construct realistic 
scenarios for evaluating AAW effectiveness of naval ships? 
To answer the first question, we vary the SAM options and presence of 
CIWS or PDMS onboard a frigate. As a result, long range and medium range 
SAMs and the PDMS are the best mix of air defense weapon systems, in 
addition to the main gun. The range of the long range missile should be more 
than 154,000 meters. 
For the second question, we vary the presence of PDMS and CIWS 
onboard a frigate. The PDMS’ defensive capabilities are superior to CIWS in 
terms of both survivability and number of enemy casualties. It is also discovered 
in the analysis that selection of the CIWS has the greatest negative impact on the 
survival probability. 
Interestingly, employment of a UAV for an AAW mission does not 
contribute to success of the operation. In each analysis, presence of the UAV 
was either excluded from the significant factors or it has less significance on the 
response surface. 
The previously stated mix of the weapons provides the best survival rate. 
Selection of the short range SAM rather than medium range SAM reduces the 
probability of survival, but it still provides a fairly good survival rate. By contrast, 
employment of CIWS instead of PDMS or selecting the pair of medium and short 
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SAMs instead of long and medium range SAMs causes an extreme decrease in 
the survival probability.  
Addressing the final question, MANA has many strengths in combat 
simulation. It has a straightforward user interface to simulate many aspects of 
combat, such as setting up a weapon and sensor capabilities, as well as defining 
the communication lines’ characteristics. Nonetheless, it has several drawbacks, 
especially those related to aerial platforms and weapons. For example, 
simulation of the flight pattern of the missiles and altitude of the aircraft are not 
included in MANA. The effectiveness settings of a gun with high rate of fire could 
also be more straightforward in the model setup. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Classified information is not included in this study. For future work, 
classified information such as probability of hit for a particular weapon or the 
detection probability of radars can be included in the model to get more precise 
results. 
We explore the effectiveness of a prospective UAV in an AAW 
environment for detection purposes. These UAVs can be loaded with weapons 
and they can serve in any environment. For future models, armed UAVs can be 
simulated in a multi-threat (air, surface, and sub-surface threats) environment. 
And, as previously mentioned, longer range UAVs with greater sensor 
capabilities can be assessed for their value to an AAW mission. 
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